[tor-talk] secure and simple network time (hack)

[Elly Jones]

On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 09:29:10AM +0300, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 8, 2013 at 6:06 AM, Elly Fong-Jones <elly at leptoquark.net> wrote:
> > Our integration code is here:
> > <http://git.chromium.org/gitweb/?p=chromiumos/platform/init.git;a=blob;f=tlsdated.conf;h=d72d780c1f1d432bb7b7a06e787a745dbf5cdd46;hb=HEAD>
> >
> > The (slightly outdated now) time-sources design doc is here:
> > <https://docs.google.com/a/chromium.org/document/d/1ylaCHabUIHoKRJQWhBxqQ5Vck270fX7XCWBdiJofHbU/edit>
> >
> > I am happy to answer any questions people have about this.
> 
> Did you test the following configuration: user boots behind a
> restrictive Wi-Fi portal, then after 5 minutes logs into the portal,
> establishing full connectivity?

In that case, nothing good happens (we don't detect that we now have "real"
network connectivity because the available routes don't change). For Chromium OS
specifically, there is pending work to be done to have the network manager cause
tlsdated to poll for time right away when we escape from a captive portal, but
in general tlsdated doesn't handle this case properly right now.

-- elly
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