[tor-talk] Choosing a name for a .onon
Maxim Kammerer
mk at dee.su
Fri Mar 30 01:52:40 UTC 2012
On Fri, Mar 30, 2012 at 01:54, Seth David Schoen <schoen at eff.org> wrote:
> Choosing the first 40 bits of a hash generally requires trying an average of 2⁴⁰
> possibilities; my laptop does about 3-4 million SHA1 operations per second
> (per CPU core) so it would take me 3-4 days (per CPU core) of computation
> to try that many possibilities on my laptop.
Due to proliferation of Bitcoin, there are now very efficient SHA-256
generators for off-the-shelf GPUs. The numbers at [1] suggest
performance that's at least two orders of magnitude faster than your
laptop — and for double-SHA-256 instead of a single SHA-1 (which I
assume can be done by the same software after some simple adaptation).
[1] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Mining_hardware_comparison
> Of course this requires being able to change something trivial about the
> public key when generating the .onion address.
Not necessarily — you can generate the hash first, and then check
whether the public key is legal. I.e., generate a 512-bit prime p, and
then go on with producing a completely random 512-bit e, and checking
whether SHA-1(ASN.1-RSAPublicKey(modulus=p*e, exponent=65537)) (which
is how Tor computes the .onion address) produces the desired result.
If it does, check whether e is prime. Density of primes in the range
of e is ~1/512, so that's just 9 bits more of search space, and
primality checking efficiency doesn't matter much.
--
Maxim Kammerer
Liberté Linux (discussion / support: http://dee.su/liberte-contribute)
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