[tor-talk] Tor and HTTPS graphic

[Mike Perry]

Thus spake coderman (coderman at gmail.com):

> a lot of infrastructure to build; call it Tor 2.0:
>
> combine LEDBAT edge management[0] with SCTP multi-homed[1] endpoints
> over ORCHID overlay[2] provided by IPsec telescopes[3] with reliable
> multicast gradients[4] and stochastic fair queuing[5] and you've got
> something resistant to passive and active attacks, including traffic
> confirmation.

Your ideas intrigue me and I wish to subscribe to your newsletter.

Can you describe in a bit more detail (perhaps in a new thread) how
stitching together a Frankenstein's creation from this collection of
protocols would work, and how it would be deployed?

And what about the edge vulnerability to these same tagging and/or
timing attacks? Data's gotta get into this mess somehow, and come
out again, right?

> 0. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ledbat-congestion-09
> 1. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4960
> 2. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4843
> 3. http://disi.unitn.it/locigno/preprints/TR-DISI-08-041.pdf
> 4. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4410
> 5. http://www2.rdrop.com/~paulmck/scalability/paper/sfq.2002.06.04.pdf

Do free reference implementations exist for all of these protocols?

 
-- 
Mike Perry
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