[tor-talk] Tor and HTTPS graphic
grarpamp at gmail.com
Wed Mar 7 18:57:23 UTC 2012
> The nodes must reside in commercial data centers
Subject only to Tor's defenses, such as CIDR block restrictions, a
node is a node. Going with the USA idea: what if the FBI, in the
normal course of business, calls up all their local cable/dsl/fiber/cell
providers and has a few lines run to each office and outhouse
nationwide. Not enough nodes? Maybe they offer their workers free
internet access and give them a secure little 'router'. Or use
routing and vpn tricks to buy/borrow enough CIDR safe node IP's
from whoever and route them all back to a node farm for easier
> the resulting possibility of discovering the interception framework
Only the node list needs to be classified against FOIA to prevent
blockage. Once the tech is figured out to the point that product
is producible, the remaining thing is what can be legally done with
it all. Warrantless and dragnet tap projects are holding up pretty
well so far, right? Certainly targeted actions are no problem.
> run untrusted software (including necessarily modified Tor clients),
> all of which exposes them to hacking risks
No news of Tor daemons being cracked to date, right? Isn't Tor full
of nodes running all sorts of untrusted software under less than
perfect admin skills? It's pretty unlikely that 'chat room' busts
use Common Criteria systems either.
> But one could try correlating Tor relays and Tor clients growth
> graphs since, say, 2000 - if at some point there was a sharp
> growth in USA-located relays without a corresponding growth in
> total clients, and if those relays have similar bandwidth / data
> center quality capabilities, then that could be "The Man".
There is this thread for starters:
I would also look to make sure the timing to a node makes sense
with its presumed geolocation. It should never be shorter than
possible, nor really much longer either.
Perhaps the threat is unlikely, but not impossible.
More information about the tor-talk