[tor-talk] Risk with transparent proxy mode [was Re:Operating system updates / software installation behind Tor Transparent Proxy]
coderman at gmail.com
Sun Mar 4 05:01:45 UTC 2012
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 3:54 PM, Hggiu Uizzu <torboxdev at yahoo.com> wrote:
> We already learned about this in  and discussed it on our Dev page 
> (and wondered why you said /29 and not /31).
some operating systems (Windows) do not support /31 host-to-host
interface configurations. in which case, a /29 two host subnet
achieves the same result (forcing all remote traffic through default
gateway, transparent proxy port in Tor in this case.
> Could you provide us with some
> pointers how such an attack would work against the currebt TorBOX setup?
the setup looks fine from a cursory check, but i would need to give it
a run to know. the concern with local network access is primarily at
the client. an insecure configuration would look like:
client(physical) eth0 192.168.1.100
localrouter(physical) via eth0 at 192.168.1.1
virtual torbox at 220.127.116.11 via eth1/tun0 (virtual device) and client
virtual torbox outgoing bridged to eth0 using 192.168.1.102 using second device.
in this case, even if client was routing all internet access through
18.104.22.168 virtual torbox, it could still be compelled to send TCP or
UDP traffic to the 192.168.1.1 and other hosts on the network. such
reflection off internal hosts can compromise your anonymity.
> The "bare metal" setup would be: client - crossover or isolated LAN -
> - proxy - (...) - internet.
cross over / isolated LAN is the key part here. if you share same LAN
between client and internal network, hosts within that internal
network can be leveraged to leak.
> If Tor is doing something funky with packets sent to those ports instead of
> routing them through the Tor network that's a serious bug in Tor.
the transparent proxy ports (TCP and DNS) work great in Tor. it is the
routing configuration between the client and these ports which is of
More information about the tor-talk