[tor-talk] Dutch CA issues fake *.torproject.org cert (among many others)

Julian Yon julian at yon.org.uk
Wed Sep 7 22:40:30 UTC 2011

On 07/09/11 23:19, Marsh Ray wrote:
> Realistically today the bank may have thousands of customers with
> malicious keyloggers for every one who is protected by an obscured
> display. This was not the case just a few years ago, the threat has
> changed. The keylogger threat might be somewhat mitigated with the UI
> changes, but the UI is largely incapable of restoring a user's physical
> security.

I should point out I'm no stranger to keyloggers. I may have written and
deployed such a tool in the past...

Nevertheless, I struggle to see how malware that can intercept
keystrokes in a browser couldn't, with a little more effort, intercept
form data instead. This would render the simplistic approach of dropdown
character selection useless.

Some banks here use some form of two-factor authentication, which I
think is a much better idea. Sadly, my bank isn't one of them.


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