[tor-talk] What happen if one create 2000 exit nodes for 6 hours?

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) lists at infosecurity.ch
Mon Nov 21 13:48:37 UTC 2011


What if someone create 2000 exit nodes in a shot, with 2000 different ip
address and a specific exit policy, for example targetting
twitter/facebook IP address spaces.

Let's say that the infrastructure will stay online for 6 hours.

Given that we have about 850-900 Tor Exit node, will such infrastructure
get about 70% probability of sniffing out all twitter/facebook traffic?

Rackspace cloud cost very few:
http://www.rackspace.com/cloud/cloud_hosting_products/servers/pricing/

Some shell scripting magic:
https://github.com/jsquared/rscurl

Could represent a cost of $30/hour = $180 to keep running 2000 servers
for 6 hours.

Let's add some bandwidth, 1GB for each server, it's $0.18 = $360.00 .

That means that setting up for 6 hours 2000 Tor Exit Node with 2TB of
bandwidth would cost $540, about 400EUR.

Would an attack like this allow a a targetted eavesdropper to get,
within the timeframe available (6hour), with 70% probability the traffic
targetted to a specific set of IP address space?

-naif


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