Is "gatereloaded" a Bad Exit?

Orionjur Tor-admin tor-admin at
Mon Jan 31 12:51:42 UTC 2011

Mike Perry wrote:
> Thus spake morphium (morphium at
>>> Do you have a rational reason why we should allow people to carry the
>>> unencrypted version of a service but not the encrypted one, other than
>>> "Well, they could be bad actors even with a good policy!"
>> As I stated above, it's not a good idea to BadExit them, because it
>> puts more load on the servers, that DO support https i.e. - and makes
>> them slower.
>> Those weren't 10K/s Nodes you blacklisted there, they've been really
>> fast Exit Nodes.
>> And I don't see ANY point in BadExit'ing 5 "random" Nodes, suggesting
>> that no one could capture your unencrypted traffic now.
>> This is just further slowing down the whole Tor-Network.
> This is not true. The exit nodes in question account for ~6% of the
> network Exit-flagged bandwidth. That is, *IF* they actually had the
> Exit flag (they did not), they would have provided 6% of that
> bandwidth. They do not have the Exit flag, however, so they provide
> 0%.
How is it possible that they configured their nodes as exits and defined
their exit policies but those nodes didn't work as exits in practice?
Are those nodes misconfiured?  So, how those can sniffing exit-traffic?
But I can confirm that somedays ago I have used oompaloompa and
oompaloompa2 for connecting to the LiveJournal.
I know it becouse their ip (and an ip of Olaf's node too) was banned by
the LJ team as "bots" and I sent to the LJ team report for unblocking
that ips as belonging not to bots but to exit-nodes of the Tor.

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