Is "gatereloaded" a Bad Exit?

Gregory Maxwell gmaxwell at
Sun Jan 30 03:12:20 UTC 2011

On Sat, Jan 29, 2011 at 9:56 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at> wrote:
>> I dont see how to recognize if the traffic is recorded?
> I know people who record exit traffic, lots of it. And they
> do all sorts of things with it too. Does that news trouble
> you? If so, you need to readjust your thinking.

It's not realistic to think that people will maintain their own
excludelists— a few extremists will, but the bulk of the users won't.

Instead, I think that nodes which exit _only_ to the unencrypted
version of a service (e.g. 80 but not 443) should be excluded from
operating as exits entirely (except as enclaves).  In this way these
nodes would be force to "pay their way".  We can't stop them from
sniffing, but at least we can make them carry traffic they can't sniff
as part of the cost of doing their evil business. They could do things
like severely throttle encrypted traffic, but that is activity that
testing could detect.

To some extent the exit flag criteria approximates this, but it's
mostly a load balancing criteria and it's actually really easy to
trick, even though this node has not successfully done so.  (E.g.
Accept 224/4:*)

As far as that exit policy goes, the RFC1918 blocks might be there in
an ignorant attempt to trigger the exit flag for completely benign
reasons, though sniffing sounds more likely.
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