geeez...

Jimmy Richardson jmmrchrdsn at gmail.com
Fri Jan 14 03:18:37 UTC 2011


Hi,:

What the hell are you talking about? The whole idea of Tor is anonymity, 
and you want Tor to make it easy to identify its users?

Thomas Jefferson already answered your question: The man who would 
choose security over freedom deserves neither.

If you want security over freedom, you're welcome to migrate to China or 
Iran.

Thanks


On 1/14/2011 9:27 AM, Mitar wrote:
> Hi!
>
> On Thu, Jan 13, 2011 at 3:01 AM, Roger Dingledine<arma at mit.edu>  wrote:
>> This is related to the "if you remove Tor from the world, you're not
>> really reducing the ability of bad guys to be anonymous on the Internet"
>> idea.
> This could be then analog argument as saying that if you remove one
> weapon factory from the world, that there would be no difference? But
> one after another and there will be.
>
> I cannot buy an argument saying that because situation is bad there
> should be no small improvements where there could be.
>
>> various other techniques people have developed over the years to deal with abuse.
> Then tell me which techniques have we developed which prevent
> pedophiles to use hidden Tor services? Which techniques have we
> developed which prevent somebody to blackmail somebody else over Tor
> network and stay anonymous? Which techniques have we developed which
> can help found out which are other people in terrorist group and trace
> their communication, once we discover they use Tor?
>
>> It depends where your jerks are coming from. If your jerks are all obeying
>> every law and showing up from their static non-natted IP address, then
>> yes, routing address is definitely related to identity. But if your
>> jerks have ever noticed this doesn't work so well for them, they may
>> start using other approaches and suddenly you're back needing to learn
>> about application-level mechanisms
> Because current protocols were done just to solve technical problems
> and not also law or other "society" problems. For example, HAM
> operators and their networks had, before they started their packets
> networks, already laws in place requiring them that each packet should
> also contain call-sign of responsible person/station. OK, in this
> particular case (as far as I know) this is not cryptographically
> enforced (but this is a technical thing) but it still shows that laws
> like this can work. So if countries (like they cooperate on ACTA)
> would declare that it is illegal to send or route or relay any packet
> without information about responsible person for it things would be
> much different.
>
> So saying that currently technology does not support this and so it
> does not matter is just because it was not required to support this.
> But there is nothing preventing that laws would be changed in this
> way. Probably also many lobbies are doing in this direction. Adding
> another required field to IPv6 is not so hard. Making it
> cryptographically secure a bit more. Do all work on teach people about
> identity thefts (which would become even more profitable) even harder.
>
> Because of this those are not arguments I could agree upon. They are
> true, but it could be also otherwise. I would like to hear good
> arguments why even if we would have in place all possible technical
> means to identify originators (or possibility to "turn" this on if we
> decide so) it would be still "proper" to not go along this path.
>
> I can see arguments for this only possible with basing the argument on
> human rights and similar values we might share. But then there are
> conflicts of those rights, security vs. freedom.
>
>
> Mitar
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