[tor-talk] de-anonymization by correlating circuit changes

[Curious Kid]

----- Original Message -----

> From: "bemoo129 at hushmail.com" <bemoo129 at hushmail.com>
> Sent: Saturday, August 20, 2011 11:20 AM
> Subject: [tor-talk] de-anonymization by correlating circuit changes
> 
> Bute if every users circuit has its own lifetime, you could very 
> easy detect: At time X there are no Packets from IP x.x.x.x (viewed 
> Website e.g.) anymore, and also no Packets to IP y.y.y.y (another 
> TOR relay). You can also see: At time Y, IP x.x.x.x and y.y.y.y 
> occour the first time (simultaniosly), so you know, they belong 
> together.

Even if someone knows with certainty the middle relay associated with specific exit traffic, the user's location is still unknown. Even the entry node is unknown to that someone.

If someone already knows the location of a user and the website that the user wants to visit, and can monitor both, then Tor won't (and wasn't made to) stop that someone from possibly confirming the connections based on when they happen.