[tor-talk] New Tool Keeps Censors in the Dark - mentions Tor.

[Joe Btfsplk]

On 8/5/2011 3:37 PM, bertagaz at ptitcanardnoir.org wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 05, 2011 at 03:13:07PM -0500, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
>> I think their concept is that the "friendly" ISPs will not know the 
>> true destination, therefore would not be complicit in allowing users 
>> to access forbidden sites. Apparently, after passing through the ISP 
>> to the "apparent" destination, Telex diverts the traffic to the 
>> "real" destination, based on tags inserted into the request on user's 
>> computer. In concept.
>>> "We envision that friendly ISPs would deploy Telex stations on
>>> paths between censors’ networks and popular, uncensored Internet
>>> destinations. Telex stations would monitor seemingly innocuous
>>> flows for a special “tag” and transparently divert them to a
>>> forbidden website or service instead."
> Yes, I'm aware of that, I was just saying that "friendly ISP" isn't an
> easy and so obvious concept to me. :)
>
> bert.
> _______________________________________________
Nor for I.  I may be way off, but perhaps they should have used the term 
"unwitting ISPs," vs friendly.  Workable or not, their concept seems to 
be that friendly ISPs are any that would rout users' traffic to *any* 
allowed (non forbidden) site / service.  If I understood, a friendly ISP 
would think the Telex user was going to Disney.com, but after passing 
the ISP, on the way to Disney, Telex diverts the traffic to "Death To 
(your dictator's name here).com" - the Telex user's real destination.  
It is a variation on how Tor works.  The ISP only sees you're connecting 
to a Tor node.

I don't pretend to be an expert on Telex - just the opposite.  But, it 
seems their concept is similar, except w/ Telex, the ISP thinks you're 
going to an acceptable site, like "Long Live (your dictator's name 
here).com", but after leaving the ISP, the traffic is diverted to 
another site, of which the ISP is unaware.