Active Attacks - Already in Progress?

Mike Perry mikeperry at fscked.org
Mon Nov 29 01:54:04 UTC 2010


Thus spake Theodore Bagwell (toruser1 at imap.cc):

> I don't take issue with these particular nodes, nor the method in which
> they are multiplied.
> 
> What concerns me is that any single entity (person/organization) is
> capable of convincing my Tor client to use it in the majority of
> circuits I build. The clusters I pointed out before have been vouched
> for by the community, and that's fine, let's assume they're not evil.
> But the fact remains that nobody - good or evil - should be capable of
> making themselves a party in my circuit with such reliability.

Unfortunately, Exit bandwidth is really hard to maintain if it is not
centralized, and all bandwidth is much much cheaper in bulk. It is
very hard to convince an ISP to put up with the noise, attacks, and
abuse complaints if you are a low budget node:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment

Rather than cripple the network by forcing more clients to use slower
nodes more often, we have opted to try to document the process of
running a high capacity Tor exit node:
http://archives.seul.org/tor/relays/Aug-2010/msg00034.html

We have to do the best with the situation we actually have. Trying to
force the network to route as if it were the network we *wish* we had
will only make it completely unusable. 

Please help us to create the network we *wish* we had.

-- 
Mike Perry
Mad Computer Scientist
fscked.org evil labs
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 189 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/attachments/20101128/9ff9d703/attachment.pgp>


More information about the tor-talk mailing list