Anonymity easily thwarted by flooding network with relays?

[morphium]

Hi!

> perhaps a naive comment compounded by low caffienation, but wouldn't
> longer chains reduce the likelihood (or raise the cost) getting the
> first-last spots?

How? If you have, lets say, 100 nodes in the Network, and 2 of them
are owned by you, your chance is 2 in 100 to be used as entry node and
2 in 100 to be used as exit node (simplified).
So the chance that you have entry AND exit node for 1 connection is
2/100 * 2/100, which is 4 in 10.000.
No matter how long the path between entry and exit node is.

On the problem in general I think, that it may be possible for 1
Attacker to put up a lot of servers, BUT if one government starts
doing this, I think, another government will, too.

So no one will hold more than 90% of the nodes, I guess not even more
than 50%, because we don't only have 2 large governments in this world
;)

Best regards,
morphium
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