Anonymity easily thwarted by flooding network with relays?

[Jonathan D. Proulx]

On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 11:03:41PM -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote:
:On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 06:19:03PM -0800, Theodore Bagwell wrote:

:> I nominate this paper as a founding reason why Tor should permit users
:> to increase the number of relay nodes used in each circuit above the
:> current value of 3...
:
:No, that won't work. The key vulnerability is the first-last correlation
:attack, which doesn't care how many hops your path has (as long
:as it's at least two).

perhaps a naive comment compounded by low caffienation, but wouldn't
longer chains reduce the likelihood (or raise the cost) getting the
first-last spots?  Or maybe the performace loss to privacy gain ratio
for this isn't worth it?

-Jon
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