Anonymity easily thwarted by flooding network with relays?

[zzzjethro666 at email2me.net]

-----Original Message-----
From: Theodore Bagwell <toruser1 at imap.cc>
To: or-talk at seul.org
Sent: Fri, Nov 19, 2010 9:19 am
Subject: Anonymity easily thwarted by flooding network with relays?


Some of you may be aware of the paper,"Cyber Crime Scene Investigations
C2SI) through Cloud Computing"
http://www.cs.uml.edu/~xinwenfu/paper/SPCC10_Fu.pdf) which illustrates
 feasible method of invalidating the anonymity afforded by Tor.
For those who are not, the approach is this: Someone with a lot of
oney, such as a government, uses cloud computing to release a veritable
rmy of Tor relays into the Tor network. The number of legitimate Tor
elay nodes in the network is dwarfed by those under the government's
ontrol. The chances of your Tor client choosing a government-controlled
"evil") Tor node when building a circuit increase to 99/100. Since one
ntity (the government) controls the evil relay nodes, and 2 or 3 of the
hree relay nodes in your circuit are evil; chances are you have no
nonymity left to speak of.
Does anyone have any comments on this paper? Any reassurance? Frankly,
his is scary.
I nominate this paper as a founding reason why Tor should permit users
o increase the number of relay nodes used in each circuit above the
urrent value of 3...
Thoughts?
-- 
 Theodore Bagwell
 toruser1 at imap.cc
-- 
ttp://www.fastmail.fm - The professional email service
Hello.
I cannot speak to the technical side of your comments and the paper you use 
but I agree with you on being able to increase the number of hops.

It seems we should never underestimate their knowledge, intelligence, 
lack of compassion and the backing of the entire welfare system that they have used 
to build such weapons to be used against the citizens. I've read some of 
their oaths and no where do they mention protecting their bosses.
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