Relay flooding, confirmation, HS's, default relay, web of trust

[John Case]

On Mon, 6 Dec 2010, grarpamp wrote:

> And what if the oponnent runs a hidden service trap?... seems that
> then just watching or running the client's entry guard [1] is all that
> is needed to confirm both connection and content? Yipes?!!!
>
> I'm no expert. This sounds like a very hard and real problem. Thanks!
>
> [1] One single lucky node, not two, the trap serves as the exit
> watchpoint as well.


I'm too obtuse to understand, just with your footnote alone, what a 
"hidden service trap" is - would you provide a further explanation, or a 
link to one ?


> Maybe there would also be benefit in a web of trust amongst nodes
> not unlike a keysigning party. As with social networking, people
> vouch for each other in various ways and strengths based on how
> they feel that person meets them. I don't see any reason why node
> operators [descriptors] could not keysign and have that web encoded
> into the descriptors, directories, DHT, etc.


I proposed early in the previous thread that not only should a web of 
trust be considered, but that this was indeed a classic case of a web of 
trust ... I didn't see any comment on this from the Big Names on the list, 
though...
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