Adding voip to torchat

hhhh xhdhx johncalisano at gmail.com
Thu Dec 23 14:30:14 UTC 2010


My plan goes like this .

1.) Build a barebones SIP client based on SofiaSip.
2.) Support only codec2 ( audio codec )
3.) No encryption is implemented by the SIP client ( like ZRTP etc ) as the
hidden service takes care of that.
4.) Each SIP client will be a hidden service , using authentication similar
to torchat , as it is the most natural way .
5.) Hopefully with codec2 , it can be sent through Tcp , the idea is to keep
the network traffic as low as possible .

Comments & Brickbats pls .

On Tue, Dec 21, 2010 at 11:43 PM, hhhh xhdhx <johncalisano at gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Dec 21, 2010 at 3:58 AM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> > From reading on OnionCat , the clients are essentially hidden services
>> > once a connection is made it is bidirectional.
>>
>> No, OC is just a daemon shuffling data back and forth across a
>> Tor HiddenServicePort. Tor provides a bidir return path to the
>> source, which the listener (OC) can use, if it thinks it should...
>>
>> > If A initiates a connection
>> > to B , A can be sure he/she is talking to B
>>
>> Yes, up to the 80-bit addressing of Tor. OC translates your request
>> for a v6 address into an onion address and puts that stream through
>> Tor.
>>
>> > but the opposite isnt true .So
>> > if B has to sure he/she is indeed talking to A , he/she has to initiate
>> a
>> > connection to A [..... to query and confirm it .....].
>>
>> Yes. Because B's onion is seeing no onion source address. And B's
>> OC is seeing an arbitrary v6 source address.
>>
>> Since most protocols require a reverse channel, it's actually B that
>> is more at risk of sending their data off to onions unknown. Luckily,
>> that is where B (if human and not a dolt) usually notices something
>> is broken and quits it.
>>
>> And it's kind of pointless to do such spoofing because if A wanted
>> B's return stream, it should have just asked for it. So it would just be
>> for the lol's of A blindly convincing B (or B's computer, app, etc) to
>> disclose something to C.
>>
>> > Which is what torchat does to authenticate both the parties
>> > , even if OnionCat is being used the same has to be done to ensure both
>> the
>> > people know who they are talking to. Am I right in my observation ??
>>
>> Yes, and as before, OC had plans to do a little OCtoOC ping pong too.
>> If running IPSEC, etc over v6, learning or making stashes of source
>> key-v6 associations, that might do it too, more work, same thing.
>>
>>  So what intrigeri was talking abt was the torifying of voip and not
> necessarily a fully authenticated peer to peer commuincation where A is sure
> of B  & B is sure of A.
>
>> OC is just another app that plugs into Tor, no different than TorChat.
>> It just happens to present the user with a cool and immensely useful
>> v6 address instead of a cute little chat prompt.
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>
>
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