AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

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I'm not sure that the correlation attacks for `bridge exits' are better than
those for normal bridges. However, the `exit risk' would likely be more
discouraging to such `bridge exits'. However, as a more general question,
making the Tor network difficult to completely enumerate might be
interesting. Clearly, there are valuable advantages to a hard-to-map
network, but can it be done without gross disadvantages?


2009/11/24 Damian Johnson <atagar1 at gmail.com>

> Interesting idea, but seems like it could be pretty dangerous. If an
> attacker was able to figure out the subset of Tor users taking advantage of
> these special exits and ran one themselves then correlation probably
> wouldn't be too difficult. In addition, abuse issues makes finding exit
> operators a lot harder than bridges so you probably wouldn't get the vast
> number of volunteers needed for the current bridge distribution tactics.
> -Damian
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 24, 2009 at 5:05 PM, Ted Smith <teddks at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote:
>> > See especially point #1: "even if we didn't tell clients about the
>> > list of
>> > relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections
>> > through
>> > Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see."
>> >
>> > I guess we could perhaps add support for configuring your own secret
>> > exit node that your buddy runs for you. But at that point the
>> > anonymity
>> > that Tor can provide in that situation gets pretty fuzzy.
>>
>> It's like a bridge, but for exits. They would probably have to be a lot
>> less friend-to-friend than bridges, but it might still be doable. I
>> think this is what the original poster meant, anyways.
>>
>
>
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