AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

[Ted Smith]

On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> See especially point #1: "even if we didn't tell clients about the
> list of
> relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections
> through
> Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see."
> 
> I guess we could perhaps add support for configuring your own secret
> exit node that your buddy runs for you. But at that point the
> anonymity
> that Tor can provide in that situation gets pretty fuzzy. 

It's like a bridge, but for exits. They would probably have to be a lot
less friend-to-friend than bridges, but it might still be doable. I
think this is what the original poster meant, anyways.
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