The Case for Banning Reduced Hop Count Implementations

Gregory Maxwell gmaxwell at gmail.com
Mon Nov 23 07:43:47 UTC 2009


On Mon, Nov 23, 2009 at 12:29 AM, Lucky Green <shamrock at cypherpunks.to> wrote:
[snip]
> seeking higher anonymity. The end state, if lower than three hop
> implementations are permitted to use the Tor network, is that Tor's
> network performance will acceptable only to users of lower hop clients.

I presume you can back this assertion up with simulation results, at a minimum?

I look forward to reading your paper.

[snip]
> origin. The protocols commonly used for such downloads can accept higher
> latency than the interactive protocols needed by the part of the user

Which is why twiddling the hop count isn't attractive for them.

It is attractive for IRC, for example, because with the current hop counts
it can be difficult to keep a TCP connection up for long.  Long lived
connections don't benefit much from the longer paths in any case because the
provide ample opportunity to simply correlate entry and exit traffic and ignore
the interior path.
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