How to strictly exclude exit nodes?

Scott Bennett bennett at cs.niu.edu
Sun Sep 28 06:45:19 UTC 2008


     On Sat, 27 Sep 2008 17:13:02 -0600 "John Brooks" <aspecialj at gmail.com>
wrote:
>4 and 5 hop circuits can be created when contacting or publishing
>hidden services and, I believe, sometimes when retrieving directory

     A circuit to a hidden service may indeed have four or more hops.
However, the client sees only the hops on the client's side of the
rendezvous and the server sees only the hops on the server's side of
the rendezvous.  Even the number of hops on the other party's side of
the rendezvous is unknown to the party that is curious.

>information. Many nodes run directories on port 443, so that's not
>particularly unusual.

     I'm not sure why a non-hidden-service circuit would have more than
the hard-coded default number of hops unless a controller has directed
the client in building that circuit.
>
>For the thread as a whole, I still think the problem is that this exit
>node is being *explicitly* requested (www.google.com.blabla.exit), and
>that it would never be chosen automatically by tor itself, as I stated
>in my first message. StrictExitNodes is an irrelevant setting.

     I agree.  It's his own fault.


                                  Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG
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