Performance

[Dominik Schaefer]

Marco Bonetti schrieb:
> doesn't changing the CircuitBuildTimeout and the NumEntryGuards give an
> advantage to an attacker which is spying on your connections?
> IIRC it should be mentioned in the design documents: an attacker which
> is reading traffic can isolate clusters of users depending on their tor
> client behavior and then launching other types of attack on them with
> higher percentage of success due to the previous clustering.
That point was always one that prevented me from playing around with too many
Tor settings. In addition, I am not sure, if it won't harm the Tor network as
a whole if too many peoply tune their options to prefer low-latency circuits
and/or certain high-bandwidth relays, which will cause even more frustrated
users who also use the same tips and so forth...

Dominik