Oh boy...

[Kyle Williams]

Theory and tests in ideal lab conditions are one thing.  Running these ideas
against a real world network is another.
I was to see video of this if it's really true.


On Wed, May 21, 2008 at 12:18 PM, F. Fox <kitsune.or at gmail.com> wrote:

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> I know someone else mentioned this, but I misplaced the email:
>
> ********
>
> - From : http://web.crypto.cs.sunysb.edu/spday/
>
> "Simulating a Global Passive Adversary for Attacking Tor-like Anonymity
> Systems
> We present a novel, practical, and effective mechanism for identifying
> the IP address of Tor clients. We approximate an almost-global passive
> adversary (GPA) capable of eavesdropping anywhere in the network by
> using LinkWidth, a novel bandwidth-estimation technique. LinkWidth
> allows network edge-attached entities to estimate the available
> bandwidth in an arbitrary Internet link without a cooperating peer host,
> router, or ISP. By modulating the bandwidth of an anonymous connection
> (e.g., when the destination server or its router is under our control),
> we can observe these fluctuations as they propagate through the Tor
> network and the Internet to the end-user's IP address. Our technique
> exploits one of the design criteria for Tor (trading off GPA-resistance
> for improved latency/bandwidth over MIXes) by allowing well-provisioned
> (in terms of bandwidth) adversaries to effectively become GPAs. Although
> timing-based attacks have been demonstrated against
> non-timing-preserving anonymity networks, they have depended either on a
> global passive adversary or on the compromise of a substantial number of
> Tor nodes. Our technique does not require compromise of any Tor nodes or
> collaboration of the end-server (for some scenarios). We demonstrate the
> effectiveness of our approach in tracking the IP address of Tor users in
> a series of experiments. Even for an under-provisioned adversary with
> only two network vantage points, we can accurately identify the end user
> (IP address) in many cases. Furthermore, we show that a well-provisioned
> adversary, using a topological map of the network, can trace-back the
> path of an anonymous user in under 20 minutes. Finally, we can trace an
> anonymous Location Hidden Service in approximately 120 minutes."
>
> *********
>
> I wonder if this could be true, and what exactly this all means; if it
> means that pretty much anyone can jump into the role of a GPA, we're
> screwed.
>
> - --
> F. Fox
> AAS, CompTIA A+/Network+/Security+
> Owner of Tor node "kitsune"
> http://fenrisfox.livejournal.com
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