Prebuilding circuits?

Kees Vonk keesvonk at gmail.com
Wed Mar 12 22:59:24 UTC 2008


F. Fox wrote:
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> Kees Vonk wrote:
>> I have found that while using Tor the first connection to a site always
>> times out. As I understand it, this is because Tor is still building a
>> circuit to the site in question.
> (snip)
> 
> First, a bit about Tor's circuitry:
> 
> Tor doesn't build circuits to sites - it builds circuits from a user to
> an exit node. That exit node then makes "normal" (i.e., unencrypted)
> connections to sites on the user's behalf (along with many other users).
> 
> (The exception to this are hidden services, which connect two circuits
> together at a rendezvous point.)
> 
> I'm assuming that the site you mention is a "normal," unencrypted Web
> site - i.e., port 80; let's call that site, Site X.
> 

It is an encrypted site on a none standard port, would that make a 
difference?

> For a fixed amount of time - by default, 10 minutes - Tor will re-use
> circuits. So, if you go to Site X, and then go to another site - let's
> call it Site Y - before that time is up, then Site X and Site Y will use
> the same circuit, come out the same exit, and have the same "virtual
> identity" (the IP you take on from the point of view of the sites).
> 
> ****
> 
> Next, a plausible explanation of what's going on:
> 
> Depending on the nodes that Tor chooses to build a circuit through -
> usually chosen randomly - it may take a bit to build them. Overloaded or
> slow nodes might be part of the cause of this.
> 
> If it's really a problem - or if you want to get some extra speed - you
> might add this to your torrc:
> 
> CircuitBuildTimeout 5
> 
> That tends to favor fast nodes that aren't overloaded, at the tradeoff
> of some of the added anonymity that an unlimited "Tor cloud" would provide.

That seems to improve things a little, but how bad would this trade off 
be (I mean what percentage of Tor servers would be ignored because of this).

Thanks,

Kees



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