Exit node connection statistics

[mplsfox02 at sneakemail.com]

Jan Reister:
> I would probably add your node to my ExcludeNodes entry.

I would like to see a discussion about this.

So you'd prefer using exit nodes that keep that information for their  
own? Why? Or do you blindly trust all other Tor operators until they  
show some "bad" behaviour?

I'm not a friend of two-classes knowledge, and what a Tor node  
operator can know, everybody can know. Else it's nothing but security  
by obscurity.

Can you explain what the threat scenario is for what I'm doing?

In order to advocate Tor it is said that the advantages outweigh the  
disadvantages, and I agree in general. But I think we know too little  
about the usage behaviour to make this a strong argument. How much of  
Tor traffic is "illegal"? For me personally it would be fine if even  
99% is some illegal file sharing or email-address harvesting, if in  
return just one Chinese blogger is rescued from going to jail. But for  
others it might be different. I think it's the wrong approach to just  
close our eyes and say "we don't want to know". Surveys on usage  
behaviour are not generally threatening the anonymity of the users but  
can help to make the Tor experience better.

My personal motivation is that I fully and actively support anonymity  
in the net, especially for people in authoritarian states, but I don't  
want to spend my time and efforts for people abusing Tor to download  
the latest movies because they don't have the balls to do it directly  
or for spammers who farm for email-addresses. So I'd like to get an  
idea how the ratio between the two use-cases is and if there is  
something I can do to improve the situation. I think everybody who  
supports the usability of Tor by operating a node has every right to  
try to gather some information about that. And I don't want to keep it  
for myself but share it with everybody.

I'm not argument-resistant. So tell me your views.

Best regards.