Input required on Secure Wiki project

Martin Fick mogulguy at
Mon Jan 14 20:28:09 UTC 2008

> <sattva at> wrote:
> > I'm currently working on the new project of
> tightly secured collabo-
> > rative/wiki environment software with some neat
> features, e.g. GnuPG
> > server-side integration for users' signatures
> verification and display
> > on page revisions, comments and so on. Another
> major goal is censorship
> > resistance and fault-tolerance by means of data
> mirroring between
> > several similar sites.

--- Ringo Kamens <2600denver at> wrote:

> One idea might to have a network raid drive that is
> shared by mirror servers and acessible via tor.
> Comrade Ringo Kamens

Hmm, storage level redundancy is not very useful for
anti-censorship.  All an attacker has to do is attack
one node and have it write new data which clears the
old data and it will clear the data on the
backup/redundant storage.  The data redundancy needs
to be managed from a higher level so that it would be
hard to communicate with (not just locate) the backup
location.  Imagine raid being done from your editing
browser to the various servers, but only your browser
knows the IP/"hidden tor hashed ID" of the servers.

Somewhere in tor land I read about a project which
would do much of what you describe, but I can't
remember what it was called.  It used regular accounts
on various services, free email accounts, open wikis,
newsgroups, freenet... to store encrypted data so that
no one would even know what was stored in these
accounts and it automatically made these copies
redundant.  The data was only accessible to those with
the proper keys (a lot like in "The Lodging of
Wayfearing Men").  Anyone recall the name of the
system that I am referring to?


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