AllowInvalidNodes entry, exit, ... ?

macintoshzoom macintoshzoom at lavabit.com
Mon Aug 18 14:43:13 UTC 2008


What are the real risks about this?

.. when the adversary could be also a big-bro-s ...

I am testing my tor client enabling  AllowInvalidNodes 
entry,middle,introduction,rendezvous, as I think this is the way we have 
to go for a global tor network privacy/security, as I don't trust (till 
some one convinces me otherwise) the  "valid nodes" validators, that may 
be more easily compromised by big brother-s.
As an adversary, I prefer a wild mix of tor exit nodes (sane + 
compromised mix ones) than only "valid" exit nodes, from countries that 
for sure are compromised by big-bro-s.

Using "valid nodes" I have noticed too many times mu browsing is going 
to the same exit nodes .... yes fast, but always the same tor exit nodes 
"club".

Of course, non valid exit nodes may be bad-boys, I know.

A good twek against this could be to  use a free or paid bunch of 
ssl/socks  last non-tor exit-node (paid via anonymous payments as 
pecunix or so with no javascript, etc. for a real anonymity), this 
policy should be ok?

Any light on this matter very welcome!

Mac.



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