getting more exit nodes

[Alexander Bernauer]

On Wed, Apr 23, 2008 at 07:51:51AM -0700, Martin Fick wrote:
> I really don't understand why pseudo-exit node
> anonymity is so important?  

The short answer: 
Admins who run a Tor node which is for good reasons not an exit node
should be able to run at least a pseudo-exit node without additional
personal risk.

The long answer:
As anonymity grows with the number of participants we intented to
persuade all tor node admins to run a pseudo-exit node as well.

But if it is possible to estimate the pseudo-exit node when knowing the
client-exit node legal enforcement might start to pursuit those nodes
just like normal exit nodes, too.

As the past showed even in "constitutional states" this results in tor
nodes going down forever.

And depending on the (il)legal system you live in the possibility alone
could be enough reason for you to not run a pseudo-exit node. 

> The client-exit nodes will end up being filtered instead. 

As there is no global listing of client-exit nodes you can not
distinguish whether the traffic to your server comes from the apparent
IP node or whether it originates from the Tor network.

So we think blocking client-exit nodes is not feasible.

cu

-- 
Alexander Bernauer