zero-knowledge protocols

[.FUF]

Roy Lanek wrote:

> I am talking of tracking the OTHER SIDE, the *investigators*, what they
> make/look at exactly in a tor server so to not let them, e.g., the *chance*
> to confiscate the hardware; plus a mean to be convinced that they [the
> *investigators*] are looking at X-Y only really, and that X-Y is effectively
> being suspected of/investigated on Z ... without *ruining* the inquest of
> course.

> What I am thinking at is possibly disjoint from how the system is currently
> working. It's something for local [sitting in front of the server] use only.


1) Are you talking about a system which allows investigators to prove
that they are looking for terrorist (and NOT human rights fighter)?
2) Or about a system which allows investigators to answer their
questions without shutting the Tor node down and confiscating the hardware?

Or something else?

In my country, law enforcement should obtain a warrant to break into my
house and confiscate the hardware (and they ALWAYS do so).
And it will take months or even years to give this hardware back...
So, I guess there's no extra need in such a system.

My point of view: if law enforcers need to trace some
super-puper-terrorist they can trace him in real life and use end-to-end
confirmation attacks to view his unencrypted traffic (I think pedophiles
can be traced in real life more efficiently too).