Tor blocking german nodes

[Marco A. Calamari]

On Sat, 2007-11-24 at 14:58 +0100, kazaam wrote:

> > 
> > 1) mout are born in few weeks
> > 2) all of them are exit router, no other
> >  country has more than 50%
> 
> What wanna Chinese do if they just have exit-routers? 
> Phishing unsecured logins or trying to fake ssl certificates? 
> Just with exit-routers you can't compromise the anonymity of
>  the tor network. If the user doesn't act stupid...

The right question is "What the Chinese government
or TLA's can do controlling at leat the 25%
of network?"

For example, CN has comlete control over 1/64 of
 Tor network traffic, or abour 2%.

I understand that Tor has a lot of crypto in place 
 to defend against rogue nodes, also when they are acting
 cooperatively.

I understand also that too much configurable
 options in Tor can be problematic, from 
 a programming, a debugging, and a partitioning
 attack point of view.

But I Would be very happy to have a
 fuckNodeByCountryCode= in the
 config file. Guess my favorite value ...

Ciao.   Marco

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| Marco A. Calamari marcoc at marcoc.it  http://www.marcoc.it   |
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