[Fwd: MSIE7 entrapment again (+ FF tidbit)]

Jacob Appelbaum jacob at appelbaum.net
Mon Jul 16 11:05:58 UTC 2007


The last bit of this email might be useful to someone trying to track
users data across circuit sessions. Yet another reason to cull cookies
and to disable javascript.

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: MSIE7 entrapment again (+ FF tidbit)
Date: Sat, 14 Jul 2007 00:20:54 +0200 (CEST)
From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf at dione.ids.pl>
To: bugtraq at securityfocus.com
CC: full-disclosure at lists.grok.org.uk

Hello again,

Microsoft Internet Explorer seems to have a soft spot for browser
entrapment vulnerabilities. Just to recap, in these attacks, the user is
made believe he had left a webpage (and the URL bar or SSL state data
reinforce him in this belief) - but in reality, is prevented from doing
so, and his browser continues to display assorted content originating from
the attacker.

This is a close, but somewhat more sinister relative of vanilla URL bar
spoofing. I reported a few of each kind in the recent months.

Well, here's another one, this time based on document.open() calls. In
essence, repeatedly calling this function after a new URL is entered by
the user, before onBeforeUnload is invoked, inhibits page transition - but
target URL bar state is retained. This is remarkably silly.

A live demo is available here:
http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/ietrap3/

That is all.

...

PS. The promised tidbit - since I'm leaving for a while and won't have
time to research this - in Firefox, javascript: windows can set
'domainless' cookies by specifying 'domain=.' - for example:

  open("javascript:document.cookie='foo=bar;domain=.'","_blank");

Fortunately/unfortunately, these cookies do not get sent to all sites - no
session fixation - though can be retrieved by other null-domain
javascript: / data: pages. Specifying other domains won't work. Multiple
periods will be trimmed. Path can be set arbitrarily, with certain
exceptions. Null-domain cookies load properly when stored in cookies.txt.
Q: can this be used in a manner more sinister than merely facilitating
exchange of "markers" between various user-tracking sites?

/mz





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