ISP controlling entry/exti ("Low-Resource Routing Attacks Against Anonymous Systems")
Vlad "SATtva" Miller
sattva at pgpru.com
Mon Feb 26 10:53:07 UTC 2007
xiando wrote on 26.02.2007 9:15:
> It may also be the case that ISPs in a whole country is the adversary, for
> example, SORM hardware connected to Federal Agency of Government
> Communications and Information (FAGCI) is installed at ALL the ISPs (There
> are some fights about this laid out the press from time to time, some refuse,
> but generally speaking ISPs got SORM). FAGCI also owns RELCOM, a major ISP.
> My personal assumption is that if FAGCI wants to know the location of US
> forces in Irak and around Iran - so they can pass it on to Iran - and we
> assume they assuming the US use Tor for their security...
Sorry for off-topic, but for the accuracy of further discussion: FAGCI
(or FAPSI in Russian) is defunct now for more than four years. Part of
its personnel and assets where transferred under Federal Security
Service (FSB) command (primarily the beforementioned SORM system and
cryptographic service), and another, all militaty assets, -- to the
Joint Staff's Central Intelligence Agency (GRU).
So, all military intelligence gathering and SORM system are now in the
authority of different bodies.
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