Please run a bridge relay! (was Re: Tor 0.2.0.13-alpha is out)

[Michael Schmidt]

2007/12/22, Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu>:
>
>
> > - is there a log, so that I see, if someone is entering the url?
>
> Not really. You could run Vidalia's 'bandwidth graph' and see, but Tor
> does its own activity too, so it would probably be hard to tell.
>
> What sort of interface did you have in mind?


Like this one:
http://psiphon.civisec.org/

> - and no the most important thing:  what must the censored user do with
> the
> > url ?
>
> Quoting from https://bridges.torproject.org/ :
> "To use the above lines, go to Vidalia's Network settings page, and
> click "My ISP blocks connections to the Tor network". Then add each
> bridge address one at a time."
>
> You can read more in Vidalia's Network settings page, in the svn version
> of Vidalia, if you click on "How do I find a bridge?" We'll aim to get
> a new snapshot of Vidalia out soon.



Thx, overead it.


> Is it ok if we send this thread to the or-talk list?
>
>
no. ;-) Happy Christmas.

Having "Invisible Tor Entry Points"  (ITEPs) in several other applications
would be great, so an Itep c++ library would be good.
Though we need to rise the exit nodes too. From 1200, 500 are dead or  not
stable. from 700,  400 are in the EU under logging, and from 300 nodes only
60 are exit points... how can this be rised?

Last Question: is a Bridge or an ITEP only forwarding traffic or as well
routing in both directions? so it could be the case, that one logging exit
node got data from me and I am caught because of being neighbour, so this
could be changed, if ITEPs get a modus, in which they do not route, but only
forward incoming traffic, and this not to exit nodes, but only to forwarding
routers. then the bridge is safe from data retention law, as they are one
hop behind the routing to an exit node. Could that be an option, that ITEPs
are free from exit nodes contacts?
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