Precompiled tor binary for openwrt/dd-wrt?

[glymr]

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perhaps openwrt hasn't got urandom? urandom is pretty intensive as far
as i know, it'd definitely load the little router hard. i'd say the devs
will be able to tell you if there's anything that can be done. my
initial thought is edit the source and change all references to
/dev/urandom to /dev/random - this would reduce the randomness a bit but
would also reduce loading (and in this case, may enable it to run)

> 
> I get that error:
> 	--- SNIP ---
> Sep 27 11:36:58.634 [notice] Tor v0.1.1.23. This is experimental
> software. Do not rely on it for strong anonymity.
> Sep 27 11:36:58.982 [notice] Initialized libevent version 1.1 using
> method poll. Good.
> Sep 27 11:36:58.986 [notice] connection_create_listener(): Opening Socks
> listener on 192.168.xxx.xxx:9050
> Sep 27 11:36:59.432 [debug] parse_dir_server_line(): Trusted dirserver
> at 18.244.0.188:9031 (46DB)
> Sep 27 11:36:59.435 [debug] parse_dir_server_line(): Trusted dirserver
> at 18.244.0.114:80 (E45D)
> Sep 27 11:36:59.439 [debug] parse_dir_server_line(): Trusted dirserver
> at 86.59.21.38:80 (1F85)
> Sep 27 11:36:59.443 [debug] parse_dir_server_line(): Trusted dirserver
> at 140.247.60.64:80 (F5FC)
> Sep 27 11:36:59.447 [debug] parse_dir_server_line(): Trusted dirserver
> at 194.109.206.212:80 (EAD6)
> Sep 27 11:36:59.541 [info] or_state_load(): Loaded state from
> "/tmp/.tor/state"
> Sep 27 11:36:59.546 [debug] parse_addr_policy(): Adding new entry
> 'accept 192.168.0.0/16'
> Sep 27 11:36:59.549 [debug] parse_addr_policy(): Adding new entry 'reject *'
> Sep 27 11:36:59.848 [info] crypto_seed_rng(): Seeding RNG from
> "/dev/urandom"
> Killed
> 	--- SNAP ---
> 
> Perhaps someone has an idea...
> 
> Thanks a lot.
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