"Practical onion hacking: finding the real address of Tor clients"

David Vennik davidvennik at googlemail.com
Mon Oct 23 21:18:45 UTC 2006


Total Privacy wrote:

> Later on, all between friends, more and more copys get out and finally somebody on the embassy of some very anti-freedom country get one, hand it over to their computer police, saying: Splendid, now we can execute internet users in millions every day! 
> 
> Now, what you think, fact or fantasy? 

you assume too much about these various groups agreeing with each other.
having a list of compromised nodes is one thing but having access to the
compromised pipes out from them is another. already it is possible there
is NSA spybots sniffing several, if not many, tor nodes. it still
doesn't give them the entry node or the source --> destination unless
they own a massive amount of the nodes.

-- 
http://davidvennik.blogspot.com/
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