Threats to anonymity set at and above the application layer; HTTP headers

[Ringo Kamens]

If you are up an adversary such as the government, then you will
always end up on the "it could be this person list". If you are
referring to a situation where the person runs the first node and end
site it probably wouldn't help.

On 5/22/06, Helge Preuss <scout at hyperspace-travel.de> wrote:
> Seth David Schoen wrote:
> > * timing of access (what time zone are you in, when do you usually do
> > something?) -- for communications with non-randomized latency < 1 day
> >
> > * typing patterns (cf. Cliff Stoll's _Cuckoo's Egg_ and the Song et al.
> paper)
> >
> > * typing speed
> A question crept up to me and this thread seems the right place to ask
> it (although it certainly has been asked before).
> If I cause a lot of meaningless traffic over tor, couldn't I hide
> meaningful traffic in this noise and thus be secure against timing
> attacks? Say, I start a large download and visit a website while it
> runs. Wouldn't a global observer only see the net traffic coming from
> my node? Wouldn't this make it impossible for them to correlate this
> traffic with the traffic at the website I visited?
>
>
>
>