Nick Mathewson nickm at
Tue May 16 15:39:27 UTC 2006

On Tue, May 16, 2006 at 10:24:34AM +0200, Matej Kovacic wrote:
> OK, the problem is what if authority force you to reveal the keys?
> I am sure you all know this:
> Perfect forward secrecy
>     If you lose control of your private keys, no previous conversation
> is compromised.
> Why not to add aditional feature: to generate keys each time Tor is
> started (or even for each "conversation")?

It's such a good idea that we already do it. :)  See the design paper,
or the spec.

I don't mean to be offensive when I say this, and it isn't just you
who's doing it:

     It's most unlikely that the next really useful idea for an
     improvement in Tor's architecture will come from somebody who
     hasn't taken the time to learn how Tor works today.

I'm really glad you want to help, but to do so usefully, you need to
understand what you're helping with.  If you want to improve Tor's
design, you really need to read up on how the current design works.

Nick Mathewson
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