Some legal trouble with TOR in France +
or at inbox.org
Tue May 16 10:42:21 UTC 2006
On 5/15/06, User 165 <user165 at neomailbox.com> wrote:
> There are other ways to get information about the connections,
> but it would be nice to say that you cannot get that information or
> perform any sort of censorship or compromising of the integrity of
> data sent through or availability of any destination on the internet
> using tor itself. I thought this was the whole point of tor.
I don't think it is. It's not that hard, after all, for a government
entity which can spy on your connection and the endpoint connection to
correlate the two using traffic analysis.
Tor is useful for plenty of legal things. If there were a way for
each exit node to filter out any traffic which was illegal in its
jurisdiction, Tor would still be useful. This is not at all feasible
right now, though.
> It should try to attain the same neutrality as a large backbone router,
> at least as much as is possible.
Large backbone routers aren't equivalent to exit nodes. They'd be
more equivalent to middle nodes.
> I don't want to have to worry that
> I'm actually connecting to the site I think I am. That's why I don't
> like RedirectExit .
Unless you're using a secure connection (https, ssh, etc.) you should
always worry that you might not be actually connecting to the site you
think you are. Sure, you could take away RedirectExit (I'm not
actually up on the useful purpose of it), but that'd only take it away
from people playing by the rules.
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