Some simple changes to the tor architecture I believe may greatly improve it (errata)

Ringo Kamens 2600denver at gmail.com
Mon May 15 21:24:38 UTC 2006


While this seems good for lots of circumstances, you have to realise that
this does stop people from using sites that use IP address authentication or
require you to re-login every time you change your IP. Perhaps this could be
an option provided in a checkbox?

On 5/15/06, glymr <glymr_darkmoon at ml1.net> wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: RIPEMD160
>
> I forgot one extra idea - that of generating a number of different
> circuits to be used at any one time (generation could be spaced say 5
> minute intervals by the client, circuits more than 4 or maybe 5
> generations back could be expunged in a fifo type arrangement) that,
> whenever possible will select a random route to establish any new
> connection from one of the number of circuits that are built. The
> purpose of this specifically is to address the reduction of timing
> attacks that are possible against a website - if the client sets up say
> 3-6 different circuits to retrieve the various different components of a
> web page, each circuit will have a different time signature (due to the
> viscisitudes of the network) and will make it harder to definitively
> establish the origin. (and of course every node being both client and
> server further obscures this)
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (MingW32)
>
> iD8DBQFEaKa9GkOzwaes7JsRAw1WAJ4w6ksGA9bub++V4DUbPWGR84ATTwCffqPg
> lhdTd8Jzh9YZTa8Ukhbkq/8=
> =sPG/
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/attachments/20060515/4fe04f76/attachment.htm>


More information about the tor-talk mailing list