Sum legl trubs wid TOR en France + more
Jonathan D. Proulx
jon at csail.mit.edu
Mon May 15 14:48:46 UTC 2006
So the summary on drives is:
* There's no point in being overly paranoid about wiping these because
$they already got them and can be presumed to have a copy if they
want it, the only point in wiping is the removal of potential
malware, any reforam will do that.
* Given sufficient time and money only physical destruction is
sufficient protection (googling : destruction of classified disks
SOP : gives the US Military position on this, presumably they know
what they can recover...)
ON the topic of what *could* happen:
* The worst case is you could be the subject of an "extrodinary
rendition" and spend the last painful month of your life in a dark
* The most likely case is you'll be questioned, searched, and possibly
breifly detained while the cops fugure out you really can't help
them even if you want to.
My personal anectdote about police and TOR. I was running a very
popular exit node (was usually top three at the time), I was contected
by a Sheriff from North Carolina (for those out side the US, this is
not known as a particularly lenient, or computer savvy jurisdiction).
It seems someone was commitiing a bit of credit card fraud through my
exit node. I explained how tor worked (mixing a bunch of stuff
togather repeatedly with no logs), and gave URLs to documentation.
Basicly the standard form letter on the phone. I never heard about it
again. Law enforcement is used to leads that go no where, most do.
I may have getten the benefit of some doubt due to my position (sys
admin at major comp sci lab, and the node was on that network not a
private connection), but I doubt it.
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