Anonymity questions

[Jens Lechtenboerger]

>> In addition, I think that the TorFAQ was not too precise about the
>> "global adversary".  As I wrote in my initial email, if you happen
>> to contact a server observed by your ISP or if you choose an exit
>> node observed by your ISP then your ISP "is" a global adversary.
>
> I know this is mentioned in the "wish list" of features, but extending the
> existing "MyFamily" sort of functionality (to prevent clients from using
> multiple servers I might happen to run for a path), to be "smart" enough to
> use one of the public route-servers and ensure that each router in the path is
> on a unique ASN -- or at least ensure that both the entry and exit aren't on
> the same one.

Something seems to be missing after "but extending ... functionality".
Can we hope for this functionality in the near future or not?

> A more detailed (and vastly more computationally intense) way to go about it
> would be to check the AS path list for your circuit to see if, despite the
> fact that each node is on a seperate AS, that they don't all have one common
> AS as part of the BGP path (since there are about 5 carriers that transit the
> bulk of US IP traffic).
>
> How you could do this without downloading a current BGP table to each client
> and processing it locally, I don't know -- and having run openBGPd on BSD
> before, I can attest to how much memory/horsepower that requires (current
> table is several hundred MB).

Let's call it a research opportunity.

Thanks

Jens