Tor and chained web based proxy sites?

Paul Syverson syverson at itd.nrl.navy.mil
Mon Aug 21 15:20:05 UTC 2006


Hi John,

I'm sending my reply to the or-talk list, since that is the
place from which this exchange springs.


On Mon, Aug 21, 2006 at 02:09:50AM -0400, Bestbayer at aol.com wrote:
> Hi Paul,
> 
> I was reading a discussion about how you said that combining Tor with Jap 
> would hurt the functionality of both systems. Would using a chain of web based 
> proxy sites (that do not require JavaScript or cookies) give me a more 
> predictable exit point in the free-route network, or would it increase my anonymity?

You raised the Tor vs. JAP design question. Your example, however, is
compatible with both depending whether the chain is chosen once and
used by everyone or its links are chosen by the client and changed
fairly frequently (or conceivably you could be suggesting something in
between, e.g., a client picks a route and sticks with it
persistently). I'm not sure what specifically you are asking, but I
can respond to the comparison between your two example scenarios.

> 
> Example - Three chained web proxy sites: 
> 
> http://webproxysite-1.net/index.php/110100A/http://webproxysite-2.net/index.ph
> p/110100A/http://webproxysite-3.net/index.php/110100A/http://www.google.com
> 
> Or a chain that loops back to the original web proxy site: 
> 
> http://webproxysite-1.net/index.php/110100A/http://webproxysite-2.net/index.ph
> p/110100A/http://webproxysite-1.net/index.php/110100A/http://www.google.com
> 

You are generally much worse off in the second case. There is a single
point, webproxysite-1.net, that can watch both ends of the circuit.


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