Exit Node sniffing solution...an idea...

Michael Holstein michael.holstein at csuohio.edu
Mon Aug 21 14:49:46 UTC 2006


> 4. A couple dozen _fast_ 24x7 exit nodes are run by
> trusted operators (read: known personally by Nick or
> Roger) on a local machine the operators control.

The $3_letter_agency would just *love* to have a dozen places (or 2
people) they already know about to serve the subpoenas.

> 7. All Tor traffic exits from these .EXIT.onion nodes.

Again .. you've just defined "where to wiretap".

The beauty of TOR is that anybody, anywhere can setup an exit node. The
design of the network allows an operator to sniff the exit, but still
can't tell where it came from. If you're using TOR, you shouldn't be
using your name in the first place (what's the point of *anonymously*
identifying yourself?).

I know there are other arguments for TOR like defeating geolocation, but
if that's all you're after, there are easier ways to do it (like just
rent a shell account somewhere and use SSH redirection).

/mike.



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