following on from today's discussion

[Mike Perry]

Thus spake Roger Dingledine (arma at mit.edu):

> It's certainly hard to pin down the exact risks here -- there are
> clearly huge risks on both sides. Somebody should write up a clear
> concise explanation, perhaps based on some statements from this thread. :)

I'd like to also add that it is possible for rogue Tor servers to go
beyond simply evesdropping on traffic. On one occasion I recieved a
corrupt .exe file via Tor.. It appeared to be just noise, but it woke
me up to the possibility that it is quite feasible that Tor exit nodes
can do all sorts of things to traffic: modifiying .exes, injecting
browser/media format exploits, etc etc. Since the Tor client scrubbs
logs, it can be difficult to tell which exit server was in fact
responsible, especially if they only target a small percentage of
connections.

It might be nice if Vidalia had an option to retain some connection
history in-memory only for a period of time on the order of 10s of
minutes for the purposes of monitoring for malicious/censored exit
nodes. 

-- 
Mike Perry
Mad Computer Scientist
fscked.org evil labs