Is three hops enough? (was Re: Tor client over a SOCKS proxy, and Tor client running through another Tor Circuit)
or at inbox.org
Fri Apr 28 16:51:35 UTC 2006
On 4/28/06, glymr <glymr_darkmoon at ml1.net> wrote:
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> On Fri, Apr 28, 2006 at 11:47:07AM -0400, Anthony DiPierro wrote:
> >> If there is an attack that can be made, for example, over a 9 hop
> >> chain where an attacker only has two nodes compromised, I'm not
> >> sure what it is. I suppose there could be some sort of timing
> >> attack, one that can't be easily mitigated by cover traffic.
> >> Maybe that's what I'm missing.
> what you are missing is that more hops results in a hell of a lot of
> cover traffic, but does nothing about compromised nodes. killing
> responsiveness with so many hops defeats the point of tor tho, since
> its main purpose is for low and medium latency applications.
Well, if it only takes 2 compromised nodes in a circuit to compromise
that circuit, then Tor isn't really useful for anything other than
keeping your IP address out of server logs. That's fine, as that's
all I use Tor for anyway, and it works well for that limited purpose.
I just thought there was more potential.
Anyway, as I've said in my other post, I need to delve a lot deeper
into the design information. I should probably build my own client
while I'm at it - to really understand what's going on.
Thanks for your help and information.
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