Is three hops enough? (was Re: Tor client over a SOCKS proxy, and Tor client running through another Tor Circuit)

[Anthony DiPierro]

On 4/28/06, Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 28, 2006 at 11:47:07AM -0400, Anthony DiPierro wrote:
> > If there is an attack that can be made, for example, over a 9 hop
> > chain where an attacker only has two nodes compromised, I'm not sure
> > what it is.  I suppose there could be some sort of timing attack, one
> > that can't be easily mitigated by cover traffic.  Maybe that's what
> > I'm missing.
>
> Exactly:
> http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#VariablePathLength
>
> --Roger
>

I'm going to have to delve deeper into the design and other docs.  I
thought I understood what was going on to some extent, but the more I
think about it the more questions I have.

Thanks for bearing with me and my semi-newbie questions.

Anthony