Is three hops enough? (was Re: Tor client over a SOCKS proxy, and Tor client running through another Tor Circuit)
glymr_darkmoon at ml1.net
Fri Apr 28 16:17:41 UTC 2006
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On Fri, Apr 28, 2006 at 11:47:07AM -0400, Anthony DiPierro wrote:
>> If there is an attack that can be made, for example, over a 9 hop
>> chain where an attacker only has two nodes compromised, I'm not
>> sure what it is. I suppose there could be some sort of timing
>> attack, one that can't be easily mitigated by cover traffic.
>> Maybe that's what I'm missing.
what you are missing is that more hops results in a hell of a lot of
cover traffic, but does nothing about compromised nodes. killing
responsiveness with so many hops defeats the point of tor tho, since
its main purpose is for low and medium latency applications.
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