Anonymity on mobile devices

[Christian Beil]

Thanks for your contribution, Matt.
I agree with you, but may I ask why exactly the wireless connection 
(from the mobile device to the the provider) is the biggest weakness?
We wanted to apply Tor directly on the mobile device, but there were two 
problems:
1. the device can't handle the many heavy cryptographic operations
2. the OR list is quite big and cost the user more than 1 euro each time
To improve our gateway architecture, I was thinking of the following 
(partial) solutions for these problems:
1. the mobile client negotiates a key with one OR which he wishes as 
exit node, he encrypts a single onion skin for this OR and sends the 
cell/skin to the gateway, the gateway adds the additional onion skins 
and sends the cell, therefore the gateway doesn't know the final destination
2. therfore the client needs the OR list, which could be stored on the 
device permanently; each time the client connects to the gateway he 
loads just the status of the ORs and perhaps some updates to the OR list 
(new onion routers)


Cheers!
Christian