Hello directly from Jimbo at Wikipedia

[Dustin Eward]

David Benfell wrote:

>On Fri, 30 Sep 2005 15:25:57 -0400, Jeffrey F. Bloss wrote:
>  
>
>>>So the _degree_ of trust we need is actually quite small.  It isn't "We
>>>certify this person to be a certain user, guaranteed, the same as ever".
>>>      
>>>
>>I just can't get over having a problem with that. If you're "isolating" 
>>someone, even an anonymous entity, that entity becomes recognizable rather 
>>that part of a indistinguishable whole. It just rubs my fur the wrong way. 
>>Might be unfounded paranoia, might not...
>>
>>    
>>
>No, no.  You're entirely correct.  And that was my point.
>
>The recognizable entity is not an anonymous entity.
>
>  
>
>>I firmly believe it might be better to stay away from a classical nym solution 
>>if possible. In the real world, our Chinese dissident might find themselves 
>>in deep poo for holding the nym keys, while the ephemeral nature of something 
>>like self-minted digital cash might shield them to some degree.
>>    
>>
>
>The one thing that's been made clear here is that the nym solution
>should be implemented apart from Tor.  As someone posted, those who
>adopt this solution would have to accept the implications.
>
>And those implications probably mean this solution is inadequate for
>the Chinese dissident.
>
>But as far as Wikipedia is concerned, this apparently doesn't matter.
>They don't want first person accounts anyway.  They want *verified*
>information.
>
>I'm thinking that limits the value of Wikipedia as an outlet for a
>dissident.  While I tremble at the thought of restricting *any* outlet
>for dissidents, I'm also inclined to think that Wikipedia would be
>correct to limit this sort of information.  Wikipedia is there for a
>specific purpose, and I don't really see that purpose as all that
>compatible with being an outlet for dissent.
>
>But this leads us to a slippery slope for which I have no answer.  For
>in the United States, the current administration has made a
>significant effort to stifle dissent.  The Joe Wilson/Valerie Plame
>case is perhaps the most visible example of this.  At the moment it
>appears likely that the rabid right is in serious trouble; we may be
>safe for now.  But even as of a month ago, there was a considerable
>amount of verifiable information--which I would venture to say was
>certainly suitable for Wikipedia--that the administration simply
>ignored.  Given the Patriot Act, it is not such a large leap that the
>next time something like this happens, the administration in power
>will be more likely to suppress information.
>
>And the nym solution--given "sneak and peak" searches--will be just as
>inadequate here as it would be in China.
>
>I fear this invites a far wider discussion than the one we have
>already had.  For there are large problems which the current Internet
>architecture clearly fails to adequately address--with or without Tor.
>Whether you're talking about vandalizing Wikipedia content or spam or
>phishing or any of a number of other kinds of abuse.
>
>This discussion has highlighted that anonymity poses a problem.  Most
>of us are concerned with preserving it, and for good reason.  And what
>is clear is that we need a solution far broader than Tor.
>
>I wish I had some ideas for this solution.  I don't.
>
>  
>
I've avoided this conversation, until now.

Frankly, I like Tor just the way it is.  It's NOT suitable for 
high-volume use OR misuse.  It's slow, it's quirky.  Its easy to block.  
This should make it clear to us who is our friend and who is not.  
Granted, there are some real reasons why exit nodes might get blocked.  
But compare it to the much larger volume of other methods used by the 
unscrupulous...  It becomes as stupid as the gun-control debate.

Bad things are gonna happen.  If you want to get your word out badly 
enough, just set up a hidden service with thttpd and a PHP blog engine 
of some kind.

I think having a seperate co-habitating daemon to perform this pseudo 
anonymity, for those who might want it, would be great.  It's OPTIONAL.  
Kinda like USE flags in Gentoo.  I don't have to build in X11 support 
for apps that I'm only going to run in a terminal window.  They still 
run, and they cut way back on dependencies...  but I digress...  It may 
be too much work for the site admins to impliment support tor pseudo...  
We're a very small segment of the internet.  we don't pull a lot of 
clout, especially with the black sheep reputation.

I think Tor needs less problems to solve, as in, fewer people demanding 
it do things it was really never meant to do.  Just let the network 
grow, let some people hate it.  You can't please everyone.  I never 
asked the world to love me, why should Tor?

But that's just my $0.02...